Emerging AI Frameworks in Leading Science, Technology, and Society (STS) Schools and Centers
Posted on | September 2, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Sep 02) Emerging AI Frameworks in Leading Science, Technology, and Society (STS) Schools and Centers apennings.com https://apennings.com/science-and-technology-studies/emerging-ai-frameworks-in-leading-science-technology-and-society-sts-schools-and-centers/
Introduction
Science, Technology, and Society (STS) frameworks remain critical for AI analysis and governance because they treat artificial intelligence as a sociotechnical system shaped by, and in turn reshaping, institutions, power, social relations, values, and material infrastructures, rather than as a purely technical object to be controlled through standards or rules alone.
Drawing on classic STS approaches and the emerging strategies visible in major STS programs, including those highlighted by me previously and active initiatives at MIT, Stanford, Harvard, Berkeley, Cornell, Stony Brook, and related centers), this overview maps the most relevant frameworks and shows how leading schools are operationalizing them for AI.[1]
Emerging AI Strategies in Leading STS Schools and Centers
The major US STS nodes such as MIT, Stanford, Berkeley, Harvard, Cornell, and Stony Brook (Department of Technology and Society in CEAS) are places where STS has long intersected with engineering, policy, and management. Recent developments show these programs actively shaping AI governance agendas:
MIT Program in Science, Technology, and Society continues its foundational role while engaging AI through ethics, journalism, and Institute-wide reflection on education and research norms. Faculty and events address governance, liability, and the societal embedding of AI, often in dialogue with the Schwarzman College of Computing.
Stanford Univeristy STS Program and HAI offers concentrations and courses that deconstruct AI hype, examine values built into systems, and link technical and social analysis. The broader Stanford ecosystem (HAI, Law AI Initiative, RegLab) operationalizes STS insights into human-centered AI, policy research, and governance tools, emphasizing interdisciplinary collaboration between STS, computer science, law, and management science.
Harvard Program on Science, Technology, and Society (Kennedy School) focuses on policy and institutional design. Recent work advances proactive, power-sharing approaches to AI governance that prioritize human flourishing, democratic stability, and economic empowerment over purely reactive risk management.
UC Berkeley’s CSTMS and AI Security Initiative at CLTC combines critical theory and social-justice orientations with practical risk-management standards development. Emphasizes multistakeholder processes, equity in benefit distribution, and contributions to national and international standards (including NIST-related efforts).
Cornell University’s Department of Science and Technology Studies + Global AI Initiative integrates global and pluralistic perspectives into AI research, design, evaluation, and governance. Focus areas include inclusive AI for diverse communities, transparency, accountability, and public oversight, with explicit attention to translating research into policy and practice.
Stony Brook University’s Department of Technology and Society has a new Department of Technology, AI and Society in the College of Engineering and Applied Sciences (CEAS). It is building on its long-standing TSM tradition and the motto that engineering is “much too important to be left to the engineers,” Stony Brook’s Department of Technology and Society is expanding into a dedicated Technology, AI and Society department with a new chair. NY State investment supports faculty hiring, new degree pathways, and research organized around ethics, equity, and justice, with applications to energy, health, and societal challenges. This represents a direct engineering-school pathway for STS-informed AI systems management and governance.
Other programs (Edinburgh, Twente, UC San Diego, etc.) similarly emphasize multidisciplinary training and critical engagement, reinforcing a global STS conversation on AI.
Implications for Governance
These frameworks and institutional strategies converge on several practical orientations. Governance must be process-oriented, participatory, and reflexive rather than purely compliance-based. Accountability should be traced across networks rather than assigned to a single locus. Technical knowledge claims and social ordering must be examined together. Context, power, and global diversity matter; one-size-fits-all technical standards are insufficient.
Engineering and policy education should integrate STS tools so that future designers and managers treat social acceptance, legitimacy, equity, and sustainability as core system requirements.
Leading STS programs are already institutionalizing these insights through new courses, concentrations, research initiatives, policy engagement, and (in cases such as Stony Brook) departmental reorganization around AI and society. The result is a maturing field in which classic STS analytics such as SCOT, ANT, co-production, sociotechnical systems, and RRI—are being refined and applied to the distinctive challenges of general-purpose, generative, and agentic AI.
Some Major STS Frameworks from Major Universities Applied to AI Governance
Social Construction of Technology (SCOT)
Different social groups interpret AI differently until “closure” stabilizes dominant meanings of safety, fairness, or intelligence. Governance processes themselves become sites of negotiation among developers, regulators, affected communities, labor, and Global South actors. Stanford’s STS courses (e.g., “Constructing and Deconstructing Artificial ‘Intelligence’”) explicitly train students to question hype and examine whose values are inscribed in systems.
Actor-Network Theory (ANT)
AI systems emerge from heterogeneous networks of human and non-human actants (algorithms, datasets, chips, standards, legal texts, users). Agency and accountability are distributed and can be displaced. Recent applications map how responsibility shifts in generative and agentic AI, medical AI, and public-sector deployments. This lens is especially useful for tracing why accountability often fails to land on the most powerful actors.
Co-production (Jasanoff and others)
Ways of knowing AI (benchmarks, risk assessments, capability evaluations) and ways of ordering society (who is protected, who decides, what counts as harm) are produced together. Governance frameworks do not merely regulate a pre-existing technology; they help constitute what legitimate AI is. Harvard’s Program on Science, Technology, and Society (housed at the Kennedy School) and related work on power-sharing liberalism exemplify this orientation, linking knowledge production to democratic and institutional design.
Sociotechnical Systems Thinking and Its Extensions
Classic joint optimization of social and technical subsystems has been updated for intelligent and agentic systems. Newer “intelligent sociotechnical systems” approaches examine how AI agents can themselves reconfigure coordination structures, creating recursive governance challenges. This resonates with engineering-school STS traditions that emphasize systems management.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)
Anticipation, inclusion, reflexivity, and responsiveness provide a practical STS-informed governance orientation. Leading programs adapt these dimensions to AI through upstream engagement, continuous reflection, and adaptive institutions.
Complementary Lenses
Infrastructure studies reveal the invisible classification systems and data infrastructures that quietly govern outcomes. Feminist and standpoint STS highlight situated knowledges and care. Critical approaches question technological determinism and open possibilities for democratizing design and oversight. Environmental and justice-oriented STS (strong at Berkeley’s CSTMS) foreground energy, material, and equity impacts.
In short, STS does not merely critique AI governance; it supplies the conceptual and institutional resources for building more legitimate, adaptive, and equitable governance arrangements. The programs at MIT, Stanford, Harvard, Berkeley, Cornell, Stony Brook, and peer institutions demonstrate how these frameworks are moving from theory into curriculum, research agendas, and real-world policy influence.
Implications for AI Strategies, Research, and Technical Training
STS frameworks encourage AI strategies that are:
Research-informed and reflexive — Research agendas incorporate anticipation of social effects, diverse knowledge inputs, and ongoing evaluation of assumptions.
Technically rigorous yet context-aware — Technical training (programming, systems design, evaluation methods, machine learning fundamentals) is paired with skills in stakeholder analysis, ethical reasoning, implementation studies, and impact assessment.
Network and systems-oriented — Strategies address the full assemblage of data, models, infrastructure, organizations, and users rather than isolated technical components.
Inclusive and power-sensitive — Training and research design deliberately surface whose knowledge counts and who benefits.
Adaptive — Both research programs and educational curricula build capacity for continuous learning as AI capabilities evolve.
In practice, this produces AI strategies that integrate technical roadmaps with organizational change plans, research priorities with public value considerations, and skill development with critical literacy. Graduates and researchers trained in these environments are equipped to design, evaluate, and steer AI systems as sociotechnical endeavors.
Leading STS programs at MIT, Stanford, Harvard, Berkeley, Cornell, Stony Brook, and peer institutions demonstrate how classic frameworks such as SCOT, ANT, co-production, sociotechnical systems thinking, and RRI and how they are being translated into concrete research agendas, technical training pathways, and institutional AI strategies. The result is a maturing approach in which technical excellence and sociotechnical insight are pursued together as essential components of effective AI strategy.
Notes
[1] At the State University of New York, Korea, we offer the Stony Brook curriculum from the Department of Technology, AI, and Society in New York.
AI Prompt(s) Review AI strategies emerging in STS schools in MIT, Cornell, Stony Brook, Harvard, Stanford, Berkely and other schools mentioned in my previous research on the increasing importance of STS.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations. Views are my own and do not express the stances of my employers, past or present.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Symphony of Science – The Quantum World and the Four Forces of Nature
Posted on | September 1, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Sep 01) Symphony of Science – The Quantum World and the Four Forces of Nature. apennings.com https://apennings.com/science-and-technology-studies/symphony-of-science-the-quantum-world-and-the-four-forces-of-nature/
Introduction
My EST 202 – Introduction to Science and Technology course is known for starting off with this song about the “four forces of nature.” Featuring Morgan Freeman, Stephen Hawking, Michio Kaku, Brian Cox, Richard Feynman, and Frank Close, “The Quantum World” is one of the Symphony of Science music video collections. With over 12 million views, it provides quick intro to the nature of atoms and subatomic particles, the “jiggly things that make up everything we see.” It features Morgan Freeman, Stephen Hawking, Michio Kaku, Brian Cox, Richard Feynman, and Frank Close.
The song is a three-and-a-half-minute auto-tuned chorus of physicists, mostly from John Boswell’s Symphony of Science video The Quantum World, the eleventh in the series. Morgan Freeman’s opening is the STS hook: dig inside the atom and you find tiny particles held together by invisible forces. Cox then delivers the line the class keeps: the universe is made of twelve particles of matter and four forces of nature.
That is “a wonderful and significant story.” It is also a good place to begin a course on science, technology, and society. Before we get to labs, laptops, satellites, or AI, we start with the claim that everything visible is assembled from a short list of ingredients and four interactions.
Feynman is the classroom favorite: the world is a dynamic mess of jiggling things; little things behave very differently from anything big. Michio Kaku adds that even Einstein never quite made peace with quantum theory. Stephan Hawking wants a theory of everything that is still just beyond our grasp. For STS, that unfinished sentence matters. Science is a social practice of models that work—and of gaps the models cannot yet close.
The video itself notes a further gap: dark matter and dark energy are thought to make up most of the universe, in addition to the twelve particles and four forces. So the “complete” inventory is already incomplete. That, too, is an STS lesson.
Cox’s “four forces of nature” are the four fundamental interactions of the Standard Model plus gravity. Three are well described by quantum field theory.
Gravity is the holdout.
Gravity is the weakest of the four at the scale of atoms, and the one that dominates at the scale of planets. It pulls mass toward mass. It keeps you on the floor, the Moon in orbit, and galaxies from flying apart. Drop a phone and gravity wins. Launch a satellite and engineers spend careers negotiating with it. Unlike the other three, gravity still lacks a fully working quantum theory; the hypothesized carrier particle, the graviton, has not been observed. Hawking’s “theory of everything” is, in large part, the unfinished marriage of gravity and quantum mechanics.
Electromagnetism is the force of everyday technology. Opposite charges attract; like charges repel. Photons carry the interaction. It holds electrons around nuclei, which is why atoms have structure and chemistry exists. It is also light, radio, Wi-Fi, magnets, electric motors, and the reason your laptop does not fall through the desk: electromagnetic repulsion between electron clouds. If gravity writes the large-scale architecture of the cosmos, electromagnetism writes the user’s manual for circuits, screens, and almost every device in an STS classroom.
The strong nuclear force is the short-range glue inside the nucleus. Gluons bind quarks into protons and neutrons, and hold those protons and neutrons together despite their electromagnetic urge to fly apart. Without it there are no atomic nuclei, no periodic table, no stars fusing hydrogen into helium. A nuclear reactor and a supernova are both, in different registers, public performances of the strong force. Its range is tiny—roughly the size of a nucleus—which is why you do not feel it when you pick up a book, even though it is far stronger than gravity or electromagnetism at that distance.
The weak nuclear force is the specialist in transformation. Carried by W and Z bosons, it changes one type of particle into another. That is how a neutron can become a proton, an electron, and an antineutrino—beta decay. The Sun shines because the weak force lets protons in the core convert into neutrons as hydrogen fuses into helium. Carbon-14 dating works because the same interaction slowly changes radioactive carbon in old bone and wood. The weak force is why elements transmute and why stellar fusion is not instantaneous.
Together the four forces do the work Freeman names at the start: they hold the jiggling world in place, or let it change. Gravity gathers; electromagnetism structures and signals; the strong force binds the nucleus; the weak force permits the alchemy that lights stars and dates fossils.
Why start an STS course here?
The Quantum World is not a substitute for a physics textbook. It is a compact cultural object: science edited into pop, authority figures auto-tuned, a Standard Model chorus with a footnote about dark matter. Students meet atoms as “packets of energy born in cosmic furnaces,” then spend the semester asking how those same atoms become instruments, infrastructures, and political facts—semiconductors, power grids, satellites, medical isotopes, nuclear policy.
Feynman signs off by leaving us something to imagine. That is the right last line for week one. The four forces are not only physics. They are the conditions under which every later technology in the course is even possible.
Symphony of Science – the Quantum World!
Lyrics
[Morgan Freeman]
So, what are we really made of?
Dig deep inside the atom
and you’ll find tiny particles
Held together by invisible forces
Everything is made up
Of tiny packets of energy
Born in cosmic furnaces
[Frank Close]
The atoms that we’re made of have
Negatively charged electrons
Whirling around a big bulky nucleus
[Michio Kaku]
The Quantum Theory
Offers a very different explanation
Of our world
[Brian Cox]
The universe is made of
Twelve particles of matter
Four forces of nature
That’s a wonderful and significant story
[Richard Feynman]
Suppose that little things
Behaved very differently
Than anything big
Nothing’s really as it seems
It’s so wonderfully different
Than anything big
The world is a dynamic mess
Of jiggling things
It’s hard to believe
[Kaku]
The quantum theory
Is so strange and bizarre
Even Einstein couldn’t get his head around it
[Cox]
In the quantum world
The world of particles
Nothing is certain
It’s a world of probabilities
(refrain)
[Feynman]
It’s very hard to imagine
All the crazy things
That things really are like
Electrons act like waves
No they don’t exactly
They act like particles
No they don’t exactly
[Stephen Hawking]
We need a theory of everything
Which is still just beyond our grasp
We need a theory of everything, perhaps
The ultimate triumph of science
(refrain)
[Feynman]
I gotta stop somewhere
I’ll leave you something to imagine
“The Quantum World” is the eleventh installment in the ongoing Symphony of Science music video series. Materials used in the creation of this video are from:
http://symphonyofscience.com for downloads & more videos!
Richard Feynman – Fun to Imagine
BBC Visions of the Future – the Quantum Revolution
Through the Wormhole with Morgan Freeman
Into the Universe with Stephen Hawking
Brian Cox TED Talk
BBC What Time is it
BBC Wonders of the Universe
BBC Horizon – What Is Reality
A Digital Bobsled in ICT4D
Posted on | August 29, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 29) A Digital Bobsled in ICT4D. apennings.com https://apennings.com/digital-geography/a-digital-bobsled-in-ict4d/
Introduction
Cool Runnings (1992) (“peaceful journey”) is not simply as an underdog sports story, but as a parable about entering a technological world without having to become culturally or economically identical to the countries that built it.[1]
My earlier post makes this case for appropriate development. Jamaica enters a highly technical global arena with limited resources. Still, the team succeeds by combining access to the global system with its own capabilities—especially speed, teamwork, improvisation, and determination.
Cool Runnings and the Digital World: The Jamaican Bobsled Team as Digital Nomads
Cool Runnings can be read as a surprisingly good metaphor for development in the digital age. Jamaica has no snow, no established bobsled tradition, and almost none of the infrastructure associated with the Winter Olympics. Yet four Jamaican athletes decide to enter the competition anyway.
The premise seems absurd. What could Jamaica possibly have to contribute to a sport developed in the cold-weather industrial societies of Europe and North America? That is precisely what makes the story interesting.
The Jamaican bobsled team can be understood as an early metaphor for the digital nomad. Someone who enters a global technological environment without necessarily possessing the geographic, institutional, or infrastructural conditions from which that environment originally emerged.
The digital world, like the Olympic bobsled track, has rules, standards, protocols, platforms, and infrastructure largely developed elsewhere. The Internet, cloud computing, digital payments, artificial intelligence, satellite networks, and global software platforms were overwhelmingly designed and financed in advanced industrial economies. Yet their use is no longer restricted to those places.
A smartphone with a good broadband connection can put a person in Nairobi, Kingston, Dhaka, Manila, or Lima into the same basic digital environment as someone in New York, London, Seoul, or San Francisco.
The important question therefore emerges. It is no longer simply whether developing countries can reproduce the technological infrastructure of the rich countries. It becomes, what can people do when they gain access to global technological infrastructure while bringing their own skills, cultures, institutions, and resourcefulness with them? That is the deeper meaning of the Jamaican bobsled metaphor.
You Don’t Have to Build the Snow
The Jamaicans cannot manufacture Calgary’s climate. They cannot reproduce decades of European bobsled training. They cannot suddenly acquire the financial resources, equipment, coaching networks, and institutional experience of the established teams.
But they don’t necessarily need to. They need access to the track. They need a sled. They need enough knowledge to understand the rules. And they need to figure out what they can do better.
The film dramatizes this through the team’s adaptation of its sprinting ability to the explosive push-start. The Jamaican athletes bring something from their existing environment that becomes useful in an unfamiliar technological and institutional environment. This is the point of appropriate development.
Development does not necessarily mean reproducing the path followed by the first countries to develop. It means combining globally available technologies with locally available capabilities. That distinction matters especially in the digital world. A country does not necessarily need to build its own Bloomberg Terminal, cloud computing ecosystem, global satellite network, or semiconductor industry before its citizens can participate in digital markets and spaces. It can enter the network. Once inside, local capabilities become productive in ways that were previously impossible.
The Digital Nomad Has a Jamaican Bobsled
The digital nomad is therefore an interesting figure because they carry relatively little physical infrastructure. A laptop replaces an office. A smartphone app replaces a bank branch. Cloud computing replaces much of the local computing infrastructure. Digital platforms enhance conventional distribution networks.
Blockchain wallets can replace some traditional financial intermediaries. Video conferencing replaces some physical travel. Artificial intelligence increasingly replaces portions of specialized knowledge that previously required proximity to major institutions.
Individuals become mobile because the infrastructure has become distributed. This doesn’t mean that geography disappears. Quite the opposite. Reliable electricity, broadband, education, transportation, financial institutions, and political stability remain enormously important.
But the threshold for participating in the global economy has fallen dramatically. That is the Jamaican bobsled analogy’s great significance. The digital economy reduces the physical infrastructure an individual needs to participate in sophisticated economic activity.
The Jamaican team does not bring Jamaica’s entire winter-sports infrastructure to Calgary. It brings four people.
And those four people bring what they know how to do.
From Appropriate Technology to Appropriate Digital Technology
This also extends the idea of appropriate technology developed in my original essay. Appropriate technology is sometimes misunderstood as meaning “low technology.” That is not the point. Appropriate technology means technology fitted to circumstances.
A solar microgrid can be more appropriate than a centralized power plant in a remote community. Mobile money can be more appropriate than building thousands of bank branches. Satellite connectivity can be more appropriate than waiting decades for terrestrial broadband infrastructure. And increasingly, AI can be appropriate when it augments local expertise rather than attempting to replace it.
This suggests a different philosophy of ICT4D. The goal should not be to turn every developing country into a smaller version of Silicon Valley. The goal should not be to turn every developing country into a smaller version of Silicon Valley. The goal should be to provide access to global digital infrastructure while allowing local communities to decide what to do with it. The Jamaican bobsled team does not become Swiss. It becomes Jamaican bobsled. That distinction is the whole point.
Global Infrastructure, Local Agency
This metaphor also has a political-economic dimension. Global infrastructure creates possibilities, but infrastructure alone does not produce development. A fiber-optic cable does not create a business. A digital wallet does not create income. An AI system does not automatically create productive capacity.
A blockchain does not automatically produce social welfare. The infrastructure must meet human agency. This is why the Jamaican team is more interesting than a simple story about technology transfer. The technology, or in this case, the sporting infrastructure, is only the enabling environment.
The real developmental resource is agency. The team takes a system designed by others and finds a way to participate on its own terms. This is precisely the challenge facing developing countries in the digital economy.
They should not be treated merely as markets for American, European, Chinese, or other foreign technologies. They should become active participants in designing applications, businesses, institutions, and development strategies appropriate to their own circumstances.
The Global Digital Track
The metaphor can be extended even further. The Internet is the track. Standards are the rules. Cloud computing is part of the infrastructure. Digital wallets are the vehicles.
Blockchain provides new forms of synchronized accounting. AI increasingly provides navigation, prediction, translation, optimization, and coordination. And human beings remain the athletes.
This is why digital development can be so powerful for countries that historically lacked the capital required to reproduce the infrastructure of industrial economies.
The digital environment allows a degree of leapfrogging. A country doesn’t necessarily have to pass through every institutional stage experienced by the United States or Western Europe. Mobile money can leap over branch banking. Digital platforms can leap over conventional distribution systems. Renewable microgrids can leap over centralized fossil-fuel infrastructure. Digital education can supplement physical universities. Telemedicine can extend specialist knowledge beyond major hospitals. AI can give a small business access to analytical capabilities previously available only to large corporations. These are not guarantees of development. But they alter the possibilities.
And Then Comes the Sunny Day
This brings us back to Jimmy Cliff. “I Can See Clearly Now” is an unusually appropriate soundtrack for this argument because its central metaphor is not simply victory. It is visibility. The rain disappears. The obstacles become visible. And once they become visible, they can be navigated.
That is also what digital technology can provide: not development automatically, but greater visibility into the possibilities for action. A farmer can see prices. A worker can see international employment opportunities. A small manufacturer can see global customers. A student can see educational resources. A migrant can see a way to send money home. A community can see weather and climate information.
A government can see infrastructure conditions through satellite imagery. An entrepreneur can see a market beyond the boundaries of a small domestic economy. The digital world does not eliminate obstacles. It can make them more legible and actionable.
And that distinction connects directly to my broader work on media and development. A medium becomes economically significant when it does more than represent the world—when it changes what actors can see, calculate, coordinate, and do. That is the movement from representation toward operative mediation.
The Bright, Bright, Bright Sunny Day
The ending of Cool Runnings therefore works beautifully as a metaphor for digital development. The Jamaican team does not win the gold medal. Historically, the Jamaican four-person team finished 26th in Calgary after completing three runs; the film transforms the episode into a more dramatic story of dignity and perseverance.
But that is exactly why the story works. The point is not that Jamaica suddenly became a winter-sports superpower. The point is that Jamaica entered the system. It showed that participation was possible. It brought its own resources into an environment not designed around them. And it left the track with something more important than a medal. It left with evidence that the boundaries of participation were not as fixed as they had appeared.
That is the promise of the digital world for developing countries. The objective should not be to make everyone look like Silicon Valley. It should be to make the global digital infrastructure sufficiently open, affordable, interoperable, and accessible that people everywhere can bring their own capabilities into it.
The Jamaican bobsledders didn’t need Jamaica to become Calgary. They needed a way onto the track. And perhaps that is the most optimistic way to think about digital development. Give people access to the track. Let them bring their own sled. Let them figure out how to run it. Then, perhaps, the clouds begin to lift.
And as Jimmy Cliff sings, the future becomes visible: a bright, bright, bright sunshiny day.
Notes
[1] I am using Cool Runnings and Jimmy Cliff’s “I can see clearly now” to support my EST 230 – ICT for Sustainable Development class. A central course in the ICT4D specialization, in our BS in Technological Systems Management.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations. Views are my own and do not express the stances of my employers, past or present.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: Appropriate Development > Cool Runnings > ICT4D > Jimmy Cliff
The Computerization of Society Revisited: French Social Theory and the Geopolitics of Information and Data Centers in the Age of AI
Posted on | August 29, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 29) The Computerization of Society Revisited: French Social Theory and the Geopolitics of Information and Data Centers in the Age of AI. apennings.com https://apennings.com/how-it-came-to-rule-the-world/the-computerization-of-society-revisited-french-social-theory-and-the-geopolitics-of-information-and-data-centers-in-the-age-of-ai/
Introduction
The publication of L’Informatisation de la société in 1978, co-authored by Simon Nora and Alain Minc and later published in English as The Computerization of Society by MIT Press, represented a watershed event in the socio-political analysis of technology. Commissioned by President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the text transformed computing from an esoteric technical concern into a central battlefield of state sovereignty, political economy, and democratic participation. By coining the term télématique to describe the merger of telecommunications networks and computers, Nora and Minc formulated an early structural critique of digital infrastructure. Their work anticipated the core dilemmas that subsequently defined international development informatics and contemporary artificial intelligence (AI).
In 1983, I started a year-long internship at the East-West Center’s Communication Institute in Honolulu to assist a new project, the Computerization Policy Project with Syed Rahim and Meheroo Jussawalla. Norm Abramson (ALOHANET), Herbert Dordick. and Deane Neubauer were also part of the project, and we worked closely with the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre (AMIC) in Singapore. My office was located next to Wilbur Schramm, the author of Mass Media and National Development (1964) and founder of Communication Studies. Syed Rahim and I published Computerization and Development in Southeast Asia (1987) before I went on for my PhD studies. It was an exciting time of intellectual debate and discovery that solidified my interest in this area.
In this post, I review the impact and roots of Nora-Minc Report, and emergence of an approach to the combination of telecommunications and data processing, which the report calls “telematics.”[1]
Intellectual Roots and the Post-Industrial State
The philosophical underpinnings of the Nora-Minc report reflected four converging intellectual currents in late-1970s France. The primary anchor was the tradition of dirigisme and Gaullist technological sovereignty, which viewed the state not as a passive regulator but as an active guarantor of national autonomy against foreign corporate monopolies. This administrative ethos was complemented by French post-industrial sociology, most notably Alain Touraine’s concept of the programmed society and Daniel Bell’s analysis of “post-industrial” information economies. Nora and Minc adopted the view that power in modern civilizations no longer derived solely from physical capital or raw industrial throughput, but from command over information systems and communication circuits.
Simultaneously, the authors engaged with the anti-bureaucratic critique championed by the French Second Left (Deuxième Gauche) and institutional sociologists like Michel Crozier. Rather than advocating a monolithic, top-down computational apparatus, the report absorbed the ethos of autogestion (self-management). It proposed that decentralized data grids could dismantle bureaucratic gridlock, flatten rigid state hierarchies, and foster local civic engagement. This institutional optimism was tempered by the post-structuralist concerns of Michel Foucault and early critical data theorists. Nora and Minc warned that ungoverned computerized files could easily crystallize into an invasive surveillance apparatus, a fear that directly hastened the establishment of France’s landmark data protection authority, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL).
The Legacy of Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber
The analytical lineage of the report owed a profound debt to Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber and his seminal 1967 text, The American Challenge. Both Simon Nora and Servan-Schreiber had emerged from the technocratic reform circles surrounding Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France and had collaborated in founding the political weekly L’Express. While Servan-Schreiber originally alerted Europe to American industrial, managerial, and computational supremacy, Nora and Minc modernized this warning for the era of networked telecommunications.
The two visions diverged in their practical remedies. Servan-Schreiber advocated for private corporate amalgamations, liberalized capital, and the internal adoption of American managerial techniques to build transnational European champions. In contrast, Nora and Minc argued that computing had evolved into a public utility requiring direct state intervention. This dialogue reached full maturity in 1980 when Servan-Schreiber published The World Challenge, embracing Nora and Minc’s vocabulary and convincing President François Mitterrand to establish the World Centre for Computer Science and Human Resources in Paris to foster technological transfer toward developing nations.
Confronting the Threat of IBM and Foreign Networks
At the core of the report stood an uncompromising critique of IBM and transnational corporate networks. Nora and Minc argued that the era of mainframe hardware competition was obsolete. The decisive axis of power had shifted to network dominance, transmission protocols, and proprietary data standards. They warned that IBM was rapidly moving to capture the global network layer through initiatives like proprietary System Network Architecture and commercial satellite ventures, positioning itself as an unaccountable supranational utility.
The authors argued that permitting foreign monopolies to manage national data traffic represented a form of knowledge colonization. If a sovereign state stored and processed its public archives, economic records, and corporate data within foreign databases, it would surrender its collective memory and administrative independence. To prevent France from becoming an informational colony, Nora and Minc proposed bypassing closed hardware competition in favor of building an open, publicly governed network infrastructure. This strategic pivot became the ideological and structural catalyst for the nationwide rollout of the public packet-switching network and the Minitel system.
Historical Significance and Contributions to ICT4D
The Nora-Minc report established a critical precedent for the field of Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D). Prior to 1978, international discourse on development computing was largely confined to technical modernization theory, treating computers as value-neutral tools that automatically produced progress when imported into lower-income economies. Nora and Minc systematically dismantled this technological determinism. They established that information systems are inextricably bound to structural power asymmetries, domestic political institutions, and international trade dependencies.
Their analysis furnished ICT4D scholars and practitioners with an enduring conceptual foundation. The report demonstrated that digital tools inherently reflect the geopolitical and economic interests of their creators, presaging critical development studies on global data extraction and techno-dependency. By rejecting corporate lock-in and prioritizing public utility grids, Nora and Minc anticipated modern debates regarding digital public goods, open standards, and the digital divide. The report also articulated the fundamental ICT4D premise that social transformation depends on legal architectures, institutional capacity, and civic participation rather than raw computational throughput.
Framing the Contemporary Analysis of Artificial Intelligence
The analytical framework developed by Nora and Minc remains applicable to the political economy of artificial intelligence. Modern foundation models, centralized cloud server farms, and frontier generative systems reproduce the structural threats that Nora and Minc identified during the mainframe and early telematics eras.
Applying their framework to contemporary AI illuminates several urgent structural dynamics, including compute hegemony and the sovereign AI stack; data justice and cultural enclosure; and, democratic legitimacy versus algorithmic governance.
Just as Nora and Minc warned against IBM monopolizing the telecommunications layer, the modern state confronts a concentrated oligopoly of transnational cloud providers that control specialized hardware, model weights, and compute clusters. The report’s insistence on infrastructural autonomy directly informs current initiatives to build sovereign compute capabilities, public cloud alternatives, and open-weight foundational models.
The report’s warning regarding the alienation of knowledge anticipates contemporary concerns over data extraction. Large model architectures trained on non-Western cultural or administrative data without consent mirror the informational colonization Nora and Minc critiqued. Their work underscores the necessity of domestic data governance, linguistic representation in training corpuses, and civic control over algorithmic knowledge banks.
Nora and Minc demonstrated that computational optimization cannot substitute for democratic deliberation. In an era where automated decision systems, predictive public-sector algorithms, and corporate AI ethics programs proliferate, their work reminds policymakers that technological adoption must remain strictly subordinate to democratic accountability, institutional transparency, and statutory human rights.
Summary
Commissioned by French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in 1978, Simon Nora and Alain Minc’s landmark report L’Informatisation de la société (translated in 1980 by MIT Press as The Computerization of Society) fundamentally altered how modern states analyze computing, telecommunications, and social development. Coining the term télématique, the authors synthesized several major French intellectual currents—Gaullist dirigisme, Touraine and Bell’s post-industrial sociology, Michel Crozier’s institutional critique of bureaucratic paralysis, and early Foucauldian warnings against the surveillance state. The report built directly upon the warning of American technological dominance first sounded in Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s The American Challenge (1967), but parted ways by insisting that digital networks required public, state-coordinated utility infrastructure rather than purely private corporate consolidation.
A central achievement of the report was its structural critique of IBM and transnational corporate networks. Nora and Minc argued that the battleground of technological sovereignty had shifted from mainframe hardware manufacturing to the control of network layers, communication protocols, and centralized databases. Leaving this infrastructure in the hands of foreign private monopolies, they warned, would result in the “alienation of knowledge” and transform sovereign states into dependent informational colonies. In response, they championed open, decentralized public networks. This was a strategy that preserved national strategic autonomy, spurred the establishment of France’s data protection authority (CNIL), and laid the technical groundwork for the nationwide rollout of the Minitel, Frances pre-Internet telecommunications web.
The enduring legacy of the Nora-Minc report extends directly into the foundation of Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D) and the contemporary governance of artificial intelligence. By dismantling naive technological determinism, the report established that information systems are inextricably tied to global power asymmetries, economic dependencies, and domestic institutional capacity. Today, as nations confront the oligopoly of frontier AI models, centralized cloud compute clusters, and extractive training datasets, Nora and Minc’s analytical framework provides an indispensable blueprint for theorizing sovereign compute, data justice, and democratic accountability in an increasingly automated world.
Conclusion
The Nora-Minc report represents the foundational moment when computing was first comprehensively analyzed through the dual lenses of sovereign statecraft and critical social theory. By unmasking the geopolitical motives embedded in proprietary communications networks and rejecting technological fatalism, Simon Nora and Alain Minc provided an enduring intellectual template. Their insights laid the groundwork for critical development informatics and continue to provide indispensable conceptual tools for confronting the structural, infrastructural, and democratic challenges posed by artificial intelligence in contemporary society.
References
Bell, D. (1973). The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. New York: Basic Books.
Crozier, M. (1970). La Société bloquée. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Foucault, M. (1975). Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison. Paris: Gallimard.
Heeks, R. (2018). Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D). London: Routledge.
Lyotard, J. F. (1979). La Condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.
Nora, S. and Minc, A. (1978). L’Informatisation de la société: rapport à M. le Président de la République. Paris: La Documentation Française.
Nora, S. and Minc, A. (1980). The Computerization of Society: A Report to the President of France. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Rahim, S. and Pennings, A.J. (1987) Computerization and Development in Southeast Asia. AMIC.
Schramm, W. (1964) Mass Media and National Development. UNESCO.
Servan-Schreiber, J. J. (1967). Le Défi Américain. Paris: Denoël.
Servan-Schreiber, J. J. (1980). Le Défi Mondial. Paris: Fayard.
Touraine, A. (1969). La Société post-industrielle: Naissance d’une société. Paris: Denoël.
Notes
[1] Télématique combined telecommunications and computers. It was one of the most interesting uses of vocabulary to distinguish different positions related to this emerging technological area. Informatics quickly countered it, emphasizing the computer side, and has had a longer history of usuage. In the US, the computer industry adopted the term “online” because data communications suggested the FCC could regulate it.
[2]
AI Prompt(s) L’Informatisation de la société, 1978 by Simon Nora and Alain Minc, commissioned by French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and published by MIT Press in 1980 as The Computerization of Society: A Report to the President of France marked a pivotal shift in how computers and information technologies were analyzed in relation to society and development. Trace the philopsophical roots of the report to the intellectual movements in France at the time. Combine those last three response in an article for publication with relevant citations and references listed at the end. Provide a summary and conclusion on how the Nora-Minc report contributed to the emergence of critical analysis of computers and networks worldwide and its contribution to ICT4D. Suggest how it can contribute to an analysis of AI in society.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations. Views are my own and do not express the stances of my employers, past or present.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D) > L’Informatisation de la société > télématique > The Computerization and Development in Southeast Asia > The Computerization and Development in Southeast Asia (1987) > The Computerization of Society
CIPS vs. SWIFT: Dedollarization or Global Public Good?
Posted on | August 26, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 27) CIPS vs. SWIFT: Dedollarization or Global Public Good? apennings.com https://apennings.com/digital-geography/the-100-trillion-debt-era-mmt-as-permission-sact-as-engine/
Introduction
The competition between China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and the Western financial infrastructure represented by Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is often described as a technological contest where one payment network is replacing another. But the deeper issue is who gets to coordinate economic activity around the world.
The contest between CIPS with the Chinese Renminbi on one side and SWIFT messaging system on the other is not a simple competition between two currencies. It is a collision between two fundamentally different financial architectures that reflect divergent visions of the international political economy.
In this post, I explore where global commerce and finance are heading by suggesting we look past headline exchange rates and examine the underlying financial plumbing. It is important to review the systemic philosophies, technical mechanisms, trade patterns, and vulnerabilities that separate a sovereign hub like CIPS from a (mostly) global commons like the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), which is heavily oriented towards the USD.[1]
At the level of systemic philosophy, the two networks serve opposite economic models. CIPS and the RMB are designed as a national and sovereign hub whose primary function is to anchor bilateral trading partners directly into the Chinese domestic economy and financial system. It operates as an instrument of strategic sovereignty and industrial coordination, establishing a secure, state-monitored channel that connects counterparties directly to Beijing.
In contrast, SWIFT and the USD financial system function as a flawed but globally enabling commons. Built to facilitate multilateral commerce between third-party nations, the dollar infrastructure operates as universal, open-ended connective tissue that allows two non-US entities to finance and settle trade without touching either domestic banking system. For instance, a trade between a Brazilian exporter and a South Korean importer using USD.
This techno-ideological divide is mirrored in their functional roles. CIPS is an integrated messaging and Real-Time Gross Settlement engine supervised by the People’s Bank of China. It does not merely transmit communications; it executes the final balance-sheet movement of funds in Renminbi within a single sovereign architecture. SWIFT, by contrast, is a universal financial messaging cooperative that holds no funds and settles no accounts. It delivers standardized transaction instructions, leaving the actual netting and real-time final settlement (when needed) to domestic clearing systems, specifically CHIPS and Fedwire in New York.
These mechanical differences shape entirely distinct trade dynamics across the globe. CIPS fosters a bilateral, radial pattern of trade where nations selling commodities or raw materials to China accumulate RMB balances, which they must then recycle into Chinese manufactured exports, industrial equipment, or state engineering contracts. Value flows inward toward and outward from the central Chinese node in Beijing.
The USD-SWIFT system drives multilateral, distributed trade, where companies hold dollar liquidity because it can be deployed anywhere in the world to buy energy and other commodities, settle contracts, or invest in third-party markets without restriction.
This structural divergence is enforced by the degree of capital account openness in each home country. China operates a managed and restricted capital account, using strict cross-border controls to insulate its domestic financial system from external volatility and preserve monetary independence. The US system rests on a fully open capital account, underpinned by the multi-trillion-dollar US Treasury market, which provides global central banks and institutions with the deepest, most liquid secondary market in history.
Inevitably, each architecture carries its own defining structural vulnerability. For CIPS and the RMB, the primary bottleneck is trapped surpluses where foreign counterparties accumulate non-convertible currency that cannot easily be redeployed outside trade with China.
For SWIFT and the USD, the vulnerability is sanction weaponization, using global clearing access and messaging cutoffs as tools of geopolitical coercion. This has incentivized non-aligned nations to build parallel financial circuits, trading the immense liquidity of an open commons for the political insulation of a sovereign hub.
In sum, CIPS is not simply a replacement for SWIFT. It is better understood as an attempt to build a China-centered payment and settlement infrastructure around the renminbi, while still using substantial parts of the existing global financial architecture. That distinction actually makes the geopolitical argument more interesting.
CIPS, SWIFT, and the Politics of Financial Infrastructure
The US dollar has supplied much more than a currency. It has supplied a global infrastructure for trade, credit, settlement, liquidity, and price discovery. SWIFT is only one component of that infrastructure. Dollar clearing, correspondent banking, CHIPS, Fedwire, Treasury markets, Eurodollar lending, FX markets, and the institutions surrounding them form a much larger system. Its extraordinary value comes from network effects. Companies in Vietnam, Mexico, Bangladesh, Brazil, Nigeria, Germany, and China can transact with one another without constructing a separate bilateral monetary system for every trading relationship.
That is one reason the dollar has been such an important enabling infrastructure for global development. A Vietnamese exporter does not have to trust the Vietnamese dong to trade with Mexico; a Bangladeshi manufacturer does not need to hold pesos to sell to a Mexican buyer. Dollar liquidity provides a common intermediate medium through which enormous numbers of otherwise unrelated transactions can be coordinated.
CIPS is not SWIFT 2.0
China created CIPS in 2015 to promote cross-border renminbi settlement and internationalize the RMB. It has grown substantially. By the end of 2025, CIPS reported 193 direct participants and 1,573 indirect participants across 124 countries and regions, with its broader banking network reaching roughly 190 countries.
But the distinction between payment settlement and financial messaging matters. CIPS is a settlement system, whereas SWIFT is primarily a messaging network. Moreover, CIPS remains interconnected with SWIFT and the existing international financial system. The US-China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that CIPS still relies heavily on SWIFT messaging while maintaining its own messaging capability for direct participants.
This suggests that China’s strategy is not to destroy SWIFT. It is to construct a parallel RMB-centered financial geography that can operate with less dependence on US-controlled infrastructure when necessary. That is a rational strategy from Beijing’s perspective. The problem is what happens when the payment network becomes part of a larger system of economic dependence.
The Lesson of Russian Energy
Europe’s experience with Russian energy provides an important analogy. For decades, Europe benefited enormously from Russian natural gas. The arrangement was economically efficient as Russia supplied relatively inexpensive energy while European industries and consumers received dependable fuel. But the invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that economic interdependence can become geopolitical leverage.
The European Commission subsequently described Russia’s energy exports as having been “weaponised” and embarked on REPowerEU to diversify supplies, reduce fossil-fuel consumption, and eliminate excessive dependence on Russian energy.
The lesson was not that Russian gas was technologically inferior. Quite the opposite. It was economically attractive precisely because the infrastructure was deeply integrated. The problem was that integration created vulnerability when the supplier possessed political objectives that could conflict with the interests of the customer.
This is the crucial question for CIPS. If a country such as Bangladesh, Vietnam, Mexico, Indonesia, or another developing economy increasingly conducts trade through a Chinese-controlled monetary infrastructure, it may gain cheaper access to RMB liquidity and Chinese markets. But it could also acquire a new form of dependency.
The concern is not necessarily that Beijing would immediately “control” these economies. That would be too strong. Rather, the architecture could give China greater leverage over the conditions under which economic relationships operate.
Payment infrastructure can influence who can transact, which currencies can be used, which banks can participate, how compliance is performed, how information moves, and ultimately which economic relationships are easiest or most difficult to maintain.
USD dependence to Infrastructure Dependence
This is where the comparison with the dollar becomes particularly revealing. The dollar system also possesses enormous power. The United States can use sanctions, export controls, financial restrictions, and access to dollar clearing as instruments of statecraft. That power should not be minimized. But an important difference exists between a globally distributed infrastructure and a nationally centered infrastructure.
The dollar system has become extraordinarily useful precisely because participants from many countries can use it without becoming economically subordinate to the United States in every other respect. A Mexican manufacturer can trade with a Vietnamese supplier. A Bangladeshi garment exporter can receive dollars from an American retailer. A Brazilian commodity producer can sell to China. A Nigerian company can purchase equipment from Europe.
The dollar functions as a kind of common computational and monetary language. That does not make it politically neutral. It makes it infrastructurally universal.
CIPS offers something different. It is an alternative monetary infrastructure centered on China’s currency, banking system, and geopolitical relationships. As its network expands, it could become increasingly useful for countries wishing to reduce exposure to US sanctions and dollar clearing. The US Congressional research and security literature explicitly identifies this sanctions-resilience function as one reason CIPS matters.
This creates a paradox. The world may want a more multipolar monetary system because excessive dependence on one country creates vulnerabilities. But replacing one dominant network with several competing monetary blocs can increase transaction costs.
Imagine a world divided among dollar, RMB, euro, rupee, and perhaps regional digital-currency systems. Every multinational corporation would need to manage multiple liquidity pools, payment systems, compliance regimes, exchange-rate exposures, collateral arrangements, and settlement infrastructures. The result could be less global liquidity, not more.
This is particularly important for developing economies. Their principal problem has historically not been a lack of currencies. It has been a lack of access to deep, liquid, internationally accepted currencies. Note the different circumstances faced by countries in the tiered global USD system.
The dollar’s great infrastructural advantage is that it allows countries to participate in global markets without having to possess currencies that are themselves globally trusted.
The SACT Interpretation
The global spreadsheet logic/dollar system can be understood as a gigantic coordination system I call the Substitution-Abstraction-Symbolic Computing-Telecom Synchronization (SACT) stack. Substitution replaces innumerable bilateral monetary relationships with a common settlement medium. Abstraction converts heterogeneous national currencies, commodities, contracts, and financial claims into interoperable currency-denominated units. Symbolic computation allows those units to be priced, collateralized, netted, cleared, and redistributed through financial institutions and markets. Telecommunications synchronization connects the resulting financial states across borders.
SWIFT, CHIPS, Fedwire, correspondent banks, Treasury markets, FX markets, and the Eurodollar system therefore constitute something considerably larger than a payment network. They form a global monetary information infrastructure.
CIPS is an attempt to construct an alternative version of that infrastructure. The geopolitical question is therefore not simply “Will CIPS replace SWIFT?” It is which financial infrastructure will provide the computational grammar through which global economic activity is coordinated?
And this brings us back to the Russian energy analogy. Europe eventually concluded that a highly efficient infrastructure could become dangerous when excessive dependence on one supplier created political vulnerability. The EU’s post-2022 policy explicitly emphasized diversification and resilience rather than simply replacing Russian gas with another single source. That may be the more useful lesson for monetary infrastructure as well. The future should be interoperable, not bipolar.
The answer to CIPS probably should not be an attempt to preserve an exclusive American monopoly over international payments. Nor should the world simply substitute Chinese monetary infrastructure for American infrastructure. The better objective is interoperability without political capture.
Treasury-backed dollar stablecoins could potentially become an important part of that architecture. Rather than requiring every country to construct a separate correspondent-banking system, regulated digital dollars could provide globally accessible dollar liquidity through mobile wallets and blockchain settlement networks. At the same time, interoperability with other currencies and payment systems could prevent the emergence of another closed monetary bloc.
The ultimate competition, then, is not between SWIFT and CIPS. It is between open global liquidity and politically conditioned liquidity. The dollar’s historical advantage has been that its infrastructure became so widely distributed that it ceased to look like an American product and became part of the operating environment of world commerce. CIPS is increasingly important because China wants a greater measure of control over that environment.
The central challenge for the next monetary order is therefore to preserve the extraordinary network effects that made global trade possible and affordable while preventing any single state from turning financial infrastructure into an instrument of dependency. That is perhaps the strongest argument for extending dollar liquidity, not simply preserving the existing dollar system, but making dollar liquidity more distributed, digital, interoperable, and accessible to a developing world.
Notes
[1] I started this inquiry in my Master’s thesis (August 1986) on SWIFT and other technological innovations that emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I recently decided to compare SWIFT with new Chinese fintech innovations, specifically looking at which would provide a global commons as enabling infrastructure for global development. Interestingly, at the time the name for SWIFT was Society for Worldwide Interbank Funds Transfer.
AI Prompt(s) Describe the competition between CIPS replaces SWIFT. The USD has been the enabling infrastructure for global development. Make the argument that CIPS is just a way for China to control its competitors such as Bangladesh, Mexico, and Vietnam. Remember why Europe rejected Russian energy. Too many strings attached.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations. Views are my own and do not express the stances of my employers, past or present.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) > CIPS > Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) > Dedollarization > Global Public Good > Public Good > Substitution-Abstraction-Symbolic Computing-Telecom Synchronization (SACT) > The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)
A $100 Trillion USD Climate and Energy Program for the AI Era
Posted on | August 25, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 26) A $100 Trillion USD Climate and Energy Program for the AI Era. apennings.com https://apennings.com/global-communications/a-100-trillion-usd-climate-and-energy-program-for-the-ai-era/
Introduction
This post uses a provocative meme/trope of US debt reaching “$100 trillion” over the next decade. As we know, it has already reached $40 trillion and shows no serious signs of stopping. Two other issues require immediate attention. One is the climate change dangers we are facing daily, and other is the impending challenges of employment in an AI age. This post suggests that while extremely difficult, these challenges can be adequately addressed through positive economic policy prescriptions and political mobilization.[1]
The central economic question of the AI era may not be whether governments can create enough money. It may be whether humanity can identify enough productive things to do with it. That distinction matters. A future in which AI dramatically increases computational productivity while reducing demand for large categories of cognitive and administrative labor could produce enormous productive capacity alongside weakened employment and purchasing power.
The conventional response, more consumption, transfers, or financial assets, may support demand, but it does not necessarily create the physical capabilities required by an increasingly digital, but materially dependent civilization.
A large-scale climate and energy investment program offers a different possibility. It would direct monetary capacity toward electricity generation, transmission grids, storage, nuclear power, resilient buildings, transportation, water systems, advanced manufacturing, semiconductor fabrication infrastructure, climate adaptation, and the enormous physical infrastructure required to support an AI-intensive economy.
These are activities in which software can substantially augment human labor but cannot, yet, simply replace the electricians, construction workers, engineers, machinists, technicians, inspectors, operators, and maintenance workers required to build and operate physical systems. The robots are coming, but they will need to be integrated effectively.
The International Energy Agency’s latest employment research confirms this distinction. Applied technical occupations account for more than half of the energy workforce, while AI is currently contributing primarily to administrative efficiency, design, and system performance rather than eliminating demand for construction, operations, and maintenance workers.
This creates an unusual convergence between climate policy, industrial policy, employment policy, and AI policy. The same investment can reduce carbon and disaster risks, expand productive capacity, create skilled employment, strengthen energy security, and provide the electricity required for data centers, telecommunications, manufacturing, transportation, and increasingly automated economies.
MMT Provides the Fiscal Permission
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) provides one way of thinking about the monetary side of this proposition. The important insight is not that governments possess an unlimited supply of real resources. They do not. Governments can create financial liabilities in their own currency, but they cannot create unlimited electricians, copper, transformers, land, energy, semiconductor capacity, or construction crews simply by issuing money. The relevant constraint is therefore real-resource capacity rather than an arbitrary financial ceiling.
That distinction is particularly important for the idea of a $100 trillion global climate and energy program. The question should not be, “Can the United States afford $100 trillion?” in the household-budget sense. Nor should the answer be that $100 trillion can simply be created without consequences.
The meaningful questions are: Where will the resources come from? What productive capacity will the spending create? How quickly can economies absorb it? Where are the bottlenecks? And when does additional financial demand begin competing for scarce resources rather than mobilizing unused capacity?
In that sense, MMT supplies a permission structure for thinking beyond conventional fiscal scarcity, but it does not eliminate scarcity. A $100 trillion program would have to be designed as a massive exercise in resource allocation, sequencing, capacity expansion, and inflation management.
From Monetary Capacity to Physical Capacity
A Treasury-backed stablecoin is not itself new productive capacity. It is a digital representation of dollar-denominated purchasing power. Under the GENIUS Act, payment stablecoins must be backed 1:1 by permitted reserves, including short-term Treasury securities and other specified liquid assets. The law therefore establishes a regulatory architecture in which growing stablecoin circulation can generate additional demand for short-maturity US government securities.
The Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee has explicitly identified increased stablecoin issuance as a potential new source of demand for Treasury bills, while also noting that some of that demand could substitute for existing demand for deposits or money-market instruments.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described the international policy implications even more explicitly when he suggested that stablecoins can expand access to the dollar economy globally while generating additional demand for Treasuries. This is particularly useful for the periphery tiers that have trouble getting good terms for USD liquidity.
This creates a critical distinction. Producing $100 trillion of digital dollar liquidity is not the same thing as producing $100 trillion of new wealth. The stablecoin provides the monetary rail. The real economy must determine what that liquidity mobilizes. This is why the second question, what should humanity spend the money on? is actually more important than the first.
The World Already Has a Dollar Liquidity Problem
The need for additional dollar liquidity is not hypothetical. The international financial system already contains enormous quantities of dollar-denominated obligations outside the United States. The BIS reported that outstanding USD foreign-currency credit reached approximately $14.7 trillion at the end of March 2026, with roughly 30% owed by emerging-market and developing-economy borrowers. Dollar credit to Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs) has expanded substantially over the past decade. The BIS has also emphasized that foreign-currency liquidity shortages are a major source of financial stress because institutions can face obligations in dollars while their revenues and assets are denominated in other currencies.
This is the paradox of the contemporary global economy. The world needs dollars to trade, borrow, save, insure itself against shocks, and settle international obligations, but access to dollar liquidity can become highly constrained precisely when it is most needed, especially in periphery countries.
A globally distributed digital-dollar infrastructure could potentially reduce some of this friction. Treasury-backed stablecoins could place dollar-denominated liquidity directly into digital wallets and business accounts, allowing payments to move through Internet-native networks rather than depending entirely on correspondent banking relationships.
But liquidity should not become an end in itself. The objective should be to turn monetary liquidity into productive commerce, disaster resilience, and manufacturing capacity.
Why Climate and Energy?
Energy is particularly powerful because almost every other economic activity depends upon it. AI requires electricity. Manufacturing requires electricity. Desalination requires electricity. Transportation increasingly requires electricity. Data centers require electricity. Telecommunications require electricity. Robotics require electricity. Hospitals require reliable electricity. The energy system is therefore simultaneously a climate problem, an employment system, an industrial system, and an AI infrastructure problem.
The employment evidence is already striking. The IEA estimates that global energy employment reached approximately 76 million workers in 2024, with energy employment growing 2.2%, nearly twice the rate of economy-wide employment growth. Electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and storage have become particularly important sources of new employment.
Energy efficiency provides another illustration. The IEA finds that energy-efficiency investment can generate roughly 4–22 jobs per $1 million invested, depending on the sector and economic structure, while creating employment in installation, repair, manufacturing, supply, and distribution.
This is precisely the kind of economic activity that becomes attractive in an AI economy. AI can design a building, optimize a power grid, identify materials, schedule workers, monitor equipment, predict maintenance, optimize supply chains, and assist engineers. But someone still has to pour the concrete, install the transformer, wire the building, manufacture the turbine, maintain the transmission line, repair the heat pump, operate the nuclear plant, and install the solar panels. AI can therefore become a labor multiplier rather than simply a labor substitute.
The $100 Trillion Allocation Problem
The $100 trillion figure should consequently be understood as a planning horizon rather than a single expenditure authorization. The objective would be to create a decades-long investment architecture and schedule in which dollar liquidity is progressively converted into productive assets.
The first priority should be electricity generation and grids. Renewable generation, advanced nuclear, geothermal, storage, transmission, distribution, microgrids, and grid modernization should expand simultaneously. Producing electricity without the transmission infrastructure to deliver it would simply move the bottleneck downstream.
The second priority should be energy-intensive industrial capacity. The transition requires enormous quantities of steel, aluminum, copper, transformers, batteries, semiconductors, power electronics, industrial machinery, and construction materials. Hydrogen is not a practical replacement for hydrocarbon combustion in transportation, but can be valuable for producing the heat needed for many advanced industrial applications. A funded climate program that does not build manufacturing capacity risks creating demand without sufficient supply.
The third priority should be buildings and cities. Retrofitting buildings for energy efficiency, electrification, cooling, water conservation, and climate resilience could generate highly distributed employment. Unlike many digital industries, this work is geographically tied to physical structures and therefore creates employment where people actually live.
The fourth should be transportation and logistics. Mobility solutions like electrified rail, public transit, EV charging networks, ports, resilient roads, logistics systems, and low-carbon freight infrastructure are the new mix of answers for the post-carbon focus.
The fifth should be water and climate resilience. Flood protection, drought management, desalination, wastewater treatment, coastal protection, wildfire resilience, forest management, and agricultural adaptation represent investments whose value increases as climate risks become more severe.
And the sixth should be the human infrastructure necessary to operate all of this: vocational education, apprenticeships, engineering programs, technical colleges, worker retraining, and portable credentials. The IEA now identifies skilled-worker shortages as one of the principal constraints on energy-system expansion.
The critical insight is that these investments reinforce one another. More electricity enables more manufacturing. More manufacturing lowers infrastructure costs. Better infrastructure makes digital economies more productive. Better technical education increases the capacity to build infrastructure. More productive economies generate additional tax revenue and private investment. The system can therefore produce positive feedback loops rather than merely multiplying consumption.
The Global Dimension
The program should also not be conceived as an exclusively American infrastructure project. The genius of a globally distributed digital-dollar system would be its ability to connect capital and demand across borders. A worker in Kenya, a solar manufacturer in India, a battery producer in Indonesia, an engineer in Brazil, and an American infrastructure company could participate in the same dollar-denominated economic network.
Stablecoins could provide the liquidity layer. Mobile wallets could provide the distribution layer. Blockchain networks could provide the settlement layer. AI could provide the coordination layer. And physical infrastructure would provide the productive layer.
This is where the architecture becomes much more interesting than simply “crypto.” The objective would not be to replace the dollar. It would be to extend USD liquidity into places where traditional banking infrastructure has difficulty delivering it, and then connect that liquidity to productive investment.
Don’t Confuse Dollars With Resources
There is an enormous danger in this vision. A $100 trillion monetary expansion could become inflationary if financial demand grows faster than productive capacity. It could generate asset bubbles, excessive leverage, corruption, speculative land purchases, or politically directed projects with little social return. Stablecoins could also introduce new forms of run risk, concentration, sanctions exposure, privacy problems, and financial instability.
The GENIUS Act itself recognizes that stablecoin issuance requires reserve, redemption, disclosure, and compliance mechanisms. Treasury and FinCEN are also developing implementation rules addressing anti-money-laundering and sanctions requirements. The larger investment system would need an equally serious set of safeguards.
Every major project should therefore be evaluated against real-resource metrics, not simply dollars spent. How much electricity was added? How much transmission capacity? How many homes were retrofitted? How much industrial capacity was created? How many workers were trained? How much carbon or climate exposure was reduced? How much productivity increased? How much private investment was crowded out? How much local manufacturing capacity was established?
In other words, the system needs a new kind of spreadsheet logic for public investment. It would be one that links financial allocations to physical outputs, employment, energy capacity, resilience, and productivity.
From $100 Trillion of Liquidity to a New Social Contract
This ultimately reframes the AI-era employment problem. If AI makes many forms of information work dramatically cheaper, humanity should not respond by desperately trying to preserve every existing information job. Nor should we assume that technological unemployment automatically produces prosperity.
Instead, we can redirect human effort toward the enormous backlog of physical problems that remain unresolved, such as clean energy, resilient cities, affordable housing, water availability, transportation, ecosystem restoration, advanced manufacturing, healthcare infrastructure, and adaptation to climate change. AI can make humans better at solving these problems.
Treasury-backed digital dollars can potentially make it easier to finance and transact around them. And a carefully designed fiscal architecture can provide the demand necessary to mobilize labor and capital toward them. That is the deeper proposition behind a $100 trillion era.
The goal should not be to create $100 trillion of digital dollars. The goal should be to create $100 trillion worth of additional human and physical capability. The dollars are the accounting units. The stablecoins are the distribution mechanism. The Treasury market provides the reserve asset. Digital networks provide synchronization. AI provides increasingly powerful coordination.
But the final measure of success is physical.
Did humanity build more energy?
Did it build more resilience?
Did it create more productive capacity?
Did it give people meaningful work?
Did it make developing economies more capable?
Did it reduce the probability of catastrophic climate outcomes?
And did it create an economic system in which AI’s extraordinary computational productivity complements rather than simply displaces human productive capacity? That is the real $100 trillion question.
So perhaps the most important policy challenge of the AI era is not how much money we can create, but whether we can develop the institutional, computational, and political intelligence to decide what the money should build.
Selected References
Bank for International Settlements. (2026). Foreign currency funding risk and cross-border liquidity. Committee on the Global Financial System.
Bank for International Settlements. (2026). Global liquidity indicators at end-March 2026.
International Energy Agency. (2025). World Energy Employment 2025.
International Energy Agency. (2026). Ensuring a Skilled Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Workforce.
International Energy Agency. (2025). Jobs: Multiple Benefits of Energy Efficiency.
U.S. Congress. (2025). GENIUS Act, Pub. L. 119–27.
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2025). Statement from Secretary Scott Bessent on Enactment of the GENIUS Act.
U.S. Department of the Treasury. (2026). Report to the Secretary of the Treasury from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee.
Notes
[1] See Pennings, A.J. (2026, Apr 13) MMT as Permission, SACT as Engine. apennings.com https://apennings.com/digital-geography/the-100-trillion-debt-era-mmt-as-permission-sact-as-engine/ It makes a stronger argument that spreadsheet logic and the SACT stack provide the operational engine. SACT converts the chaotic, messy physical universe into a organized matrix of purchasable products. Without the SACT translation layer, MMT’s sovereign dollars are useless signifiers; with it, sovereign money becomes an operative tool capable of re-engineering the physical world.
[2] One important qualification: GENIUS does not authorize the US government to issue $100 trillion of stablecoins, nor does it itself create $100 trillion of new Treasury demand. The $100 trillion figure is a proposed long-run scenario. The GENIUS Act creates a regulatory framework in which private payment-stablecoin issuance can expand against specified reserves, including short-term Treasuries. The macroeconomic question is therefore how such a system could be integrated with fiscal and development policy without confusing financial liquidity with real-resource creation.
AI Prompt(s) Let’s make a plan for the next decade’s $100 trillion federal debt with UST-backed stablecoin funding and MMT permission that means the money isn’t the constraint, but you can’t just pump it into the economy without expecting repercussions. You have to think big and invest and spend wisely on issues like climate change, military resets, univeral healthcare, space exploration, and cheap education. Argue that climate change is the best target because it is simultaneously invokes a risk-mitigation program, an energy-security program, an industrial-capacity program, as well as a technology platform with positive spillovers into infrastructure resilience, advanced manufacturing, and enabling systems for space and other frontiers. It will also employ/include more people in more ways, an important consideration as we move into an AI environment. So turn this into the beginnings of a policy framework for spending in the next decade.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) > US dollar (USD) > US dollar stablecoins > US Treasuries
I Can See Clearly Now: Jimmy Cliff, Cool Runnings, and the Case for Appropriate Development
Posted on | August 20, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 20) I Can See Clearly Now: Jimmy Cliff, Cool Runnings, and the Case for Appropriate Development. apennings.com https://apennings.com/political-economy-of-media/i-can-see-clearly-now-jimmy-cliff-cool-runnings-and-the-case-for-appropriate-development/
Introduction
I often use a song to set a theme for my classes. For my EST 230 – Information and Communications Technology for Sustainable Development, I chose Jimmy Cliff’s exuberant recording of “I Can See Clearly Now” that became inseparable from the 1993 film Cool Runnings.
In the movie’s final stretch and closing credits, the song’s declaration, “I can see clearly now the rain is gone… It’s gonna be a bright, bright sunshiny day,” plays over images of the Jamaican bobsled team. What looks like a simple feel-good and fun montage is, on closer inspection, a compact statement about the strivings of developing countries and the meaning of appropriate development.
The Song’s Emotional Architecture
Johnny Nash wrote and first recorded “I Can See Clearly Now” in 1972; Jimmy Cliff’s version later carried it into the Cool Runnings soundtrack and popular memory. The lyrics move from obstruction to clarity. Rain and dark clouds stand for hardship, doubt, and external barriers. Once they lift, the singer claims not just relief but vision and forward motion.
The tone is neither naïve nor triumphalist; it is earned optimism. Obstacles were real. They have been endured and, in some measure, overcome. The future is now legible. That emotional arc maps readily onto the experience of many postcolonial and developing societies in the late twentieth century. Long periods of structural constraint followed by moments of agency and self-definition.
Cool Runnings tells the story of the Jamaican bobsled team that competed at the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary, Canada. Four athletes from a Caribbean island with no snow, no bobsled tradition, and limited resources enter one of the most expensive and technically demanding winter sports.
They face mockery, bureaucratic resistance, equipment failures, and their own inexperience. They do not win a medal. They do finish the event with dignity, having adapted their approach, most famously the explosive push-start that played to their sprinting strengths, and having represented their country on a global stage.
The film is comic and crowd-pleasing, yet its underlying proposition is serious. A developing country need not accept the roles assigned to it by climate, history, or the expectations of richer nations. It can enter domains previously closed to it. Success is measured not only by podium finishes but by the act of competent participation and the preservation of self-respect.
Appropriate Development, Not Imitation
“Appropriate development” (and its cousin, “appropriate technology”) insists that progress should fit local conditions, resources, skills, and culture rather than simply transplanting the capital-intensive models of the industrialized world. Cool Runnings dramatizes this principle.
The Jamaicans do not pretend to be Swiss or East German teams with decades of infrastructure and funding. They invent a method suited to what they actually possess: speed, teamwork, courage, and a willingness to look ridiculous in the short term. Their sled and technique are improvised and imperfect, yet functional enough to compete. The film rejects both fatalism (“people like us don’t do this”) and uncritical mimicry (“we must become exactly like them”). Instead, it offers adaptive ingenuity, using global rules and venues while remaining recognizably themselves.
This is a durable template for technology and development policy. Importing the most advanced Western systems wholesale often fails when maintenance capacity, energy reliability, spare parts, or cultural fit are missing. Building on existing strengths like agricultural knowledge, local materials, community organization, and educational capacity, while selectively adopting external tools tends to produce more resilient results. The Jamaican bobsledders embody that logic in sporting form.
Sustainable Striving Rather Than Dependency
The song and film together reject two opposite errors. One is resignation: the rain will never stop, so there is no point looking ahead. The other is the fantasy that a single dramatic leap will erase all structural problems. Cliff’s vocal and the team’s arc insist on clarity after struggle, not the absence of struggle. Development is portrayed as ongoing work that requires realism about constraints and confidence that those constraints are not destiny.
In the context of the “Third World” discourse of the 1980s and 1990s, this message carried political weight. Many countries were navigating structural adjustment, technological gaps, and the cultural pressure of globalization. Cool Runnings suggested that entry into global arenas could be authentic rather than derivative, and that dignity was compatible with underdog status. The bright sunshiny day is not the end of history; it is the recovered ability to see and to act.
Enduring Relevance
Decades later, the pairing of song and film still resonates because the underlying tension remains. Developing countries continue to face the choice between passive insertion into systems designed elsewhere and active, selective engagement that preserves agency. Climate adaptation, digital infrastructure, renewable energy, and industrial policy all raise the same question the Jamaican team faced: how to compete and cooperate on terms that fit actual capacities while refusing to accept permanent second-class status.
“I Can See Clearly Now,” placed over the images of Cool Runnings, is therefore more than soundtrack optimism. It is a concise cultural argument for appropriate development: clear-eyed about obstacles, inventive in response, proud of origins, and oriented toward a future that local people themselves help define. The rain is real. So is the possibility of seeing past it.
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: Appropriate Development
The Three-Layer USD as the Primary Global Financial Infrastructure
Posted on | August 18, 2026 | No Comments
Citation APA (7th Edition)
Pennings, A.J. (2026, Aug 18) The Three-Layer USD as the Primary Global Financial Infrastructure. apennings.com https://apennings.com/dystopian-economies/the-three-layer-usd-as-the-primary-global-financial-infrastructure/
Introduction
When people speak of the “US dollar” or “USD” as the world’s reserve and transacting currency, they are usually referring to something far larger and more complex than the notes and deposits circulating inside the United States. The global dollar system is better understood as a three-layer structure with the domestic US dollar, the vast Eurodollar market, and the petrodollar flows that helped supercharge that offshore system.
Together these layers form the primary infrastructure of international finance. And despite the offshore character of much of this activity, the US Federal Reserve remains the system’s ultimate regulator and backstop. This post also includes mention of US treasury backed stablecoins, a possible 4th layer of the USD global infrastructure.[1]
Layer 1 is the Domestic US Dollar
The foundation of the USD is the dollar created and used inside the United States. This is the currency Americans are paid in, pay taxes in, and use to settle domestic contracts, and the currency the US government spends and issues debt in. The Federal Reserve directly controls it through open-market operations, interest-rate policy, reserve requirements, and management of the Fed’s balance sheet. Bank reserves at the Fed, currency in circulation, and Treasury securities form the core of this domestic monetary base.
This layer is relatively well-understood and tightly regulated. Yet it is only the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. It is created mostly by the US banking system as debt, and the US government, which legislates it into existence.
Layer 2 is the Eurodollar, the Offshore Dollar Universe
Eurodollars are US dollar-denominated deposits held in banks outside the United States. The market began in earnest after World War II, when dollars accumulated by Russia were redeposited in London and other financial centers. Because these deposits sat outside the direct reach of US reserve requirements and some regulations, banks could intermediate them more freely and at lower cost using deposits as collateral until US Treasuries added a new instrument in the 1980s when they were computerized.
Over decades, the Eurodollar market exploded. It now encompasses dollar deposits, loans, bonds, derivatives, and funding markets across Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, and beyond. Multinational corporations, governments, hedge funds, and banks routinely borrow, lend, and settle in this offshore dollar space. The great majority of international trade invoicing, cross-border lending, and financial contracts are denominated in dollars that never touch the US domestic banking system in a simple way.
Crucially, Eurodollars are still dollars. They represent claims on US currency or, more precisely, on the creditworthiness and ultimate convertibility associated with the US monetary system. When stress hits, as in 2008 or March 2020, participants scramble for genuine dollar liquidity, and the Fed’s actions become decisive.
Layer 3 is the Petrodollar — The Eurodollar Accelerator
Petrodollars form a powerful subset and historical accelerant of the Eurodollar system. After the 1970s oil shocks, major oil exporters (especially in the Middle East) received vast payments in dollars because oil was, and largely remains, priced and settled in USD. These revenues were recycled into Western banks, US Treasury securities, and other dollar assets.[2]
This “petrodollar recycling” poured enormous liquidity into the offshore dollar markets and reinforced the dollar’s central role in commodity trade. The arrangement was mutually convenient as oil producers gained a deep, liquid market for their earnings, while the United States and the broader Western financial system absorbed the capital and maintained demand for dollars. Even as energy markets have transformed and some bilateral non-dollar experiments have appeared, the structural link between oil (and other major commodities) and the dollar continues to feed the Eurodollar system.
Layer 4? Treasury-Backed USD Stablecoins — The Digital Extension
Regulated USD stablecoins fully backed by short-term US Treasuries and cash equivalents represent the newest emergent layer. Under the GENIUS Act (signed into law in July 2025), permitted payment stablecoin issuers must maintain 1:1 reserves in high-quality liquid assets—primarily US currency, insured bank deposits, short-term Treasuries (generally maturing in 93 days or less), certain repurchase agreements, and limited government money-market funds. Redemption at par is required, and passive yield on the stablecoins themselves is restricted.
The Clarity Act (Digital Asset Market Clarity Act), which as of August 2026 has passed the House and advanced in the Senate but awaits full enactment, would further clarify market-structure rules, regulatory responsibilities between the SEC and CFTC, trading-platform obligations, and the treatment of these stablecoins within the broader digital-asset fintech system.
These stablecoins function as a programmable, 24/7, blockchain-native form of dollar claim.
They extend the Eurodollar function into digital rails. This extension enables fast cross-border settlement, remittances, trade finance, and on-chain activity while remaining firmly anchored to Layer 1 reserves and US regulatory oversight. In doing so, they also reinforce Layer 3 dynamics by offering energy producers and commodity traders a more efficient way to hold and recycle dollar revenues.
The Federal Reserve as Primary Regulator
Although a huge share of dollar activity occurs offshore and beyond the Fed’s day-to-day supervisory perimeter, the Federal Reserve regulation and lender of last resort. Several mechanisms make this true. US monetary policy sets the global risk-free rate and influences dollar funding costs everywhere.
The Fed’s dollar swap lines with major central banks inject emergency liquidity into the Eurodollar market during crises.
American banks and their foreign branches remain subject to US regulation and can transmit Fed policy into offshore markets. In extremis, the credibility of the dollar rests on the Fed’s willingness and ability to act as backstop—something private offshore markets cannot replicate.
In short, the offshore layers expand the dollar’s reach and elasticity, but they do not escape the gravitational pull of US monetary policy and institutional power.
Why This Three-Layer Structure Matters
This architecture explains several enduring features of the global economy. It delivers deep, low-cost liquidity and standardized settlement that no other currency currently matches at scale. It confers on the United States what Valéry Giscard d’Estaing famously called an “exorbitant privilege,” the ability to borrow cheaply and run persistent deficits while the rest of the world holds dollar assets. It also creates channels of vulnerability. Stresses in Eurodollar funding can rapidly transmit globally, and the Fed’s decisions ripple far beyond US borders.
Understanding the dollar as three interconnected layers—domestic money, offshore Eurodollars, and energy-linked petrodollar flows—clarifies both its resilience and its points of friction. The system is not a simple national currency that happens to be used abroad. It is a layered global financial infrastructure whose center of gravity remains the United States and its central bank, even as the bulk of daily activity occurs far from American shores.
Any serious discussion of de-dollarization, multipolar finance, or the future of international monetary arrangements must begin with this more accurate map of how the “dollar” actually works.
Notes
[1] I find that many people are not aware of the complexities of the US dollar operating globally.
[2] My spreadsheet was specifically focused on the emergence of the petrodollar and how it broke down the PTTs and helped create the global Internet.
AI Prompt(s) Expand on the argument that the “USD” is the combination of 1) the domestic US dollar, 2) Eurodollars, which includes the 3) petrodollars, recognizing that the US Federal Reserve is still the primary regulator of the global currency. How will US dollar as stablecoins with US treasury backing fit into this mix if the Clarity Act passes?
© ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Not to be considered financial advice. AI is often used, and results are thoroughly interrogated. Links are used for some citations.
Anthony J. Pennings, PhD is a Professor at the Department of Technology and Society, State University of New York, Korea and a Research Professor for Stony Brook University. He teaches AI and broadband policy. From 2002-2012 he taught digital economics and information systems management at New York University. He also taught in the Digital Media MBA at St. Edwards University in Austin, Texas, where he lives when not in Korea.
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Tags: eurodollars > petrodollars > Stablecoins > USD






